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ABSTRACT
We investigate the determinants and consequences of budget reallocations—that is, corrective changes
to the budget made during the year. Using proprietary data from a large consumer goods manufacturer,
we analyze the extent to which initial budgeting decisions drive reallocations. Examining this relation-
ship is important because initial budget negotiations are often troubled by power struggles and
politicking, which may give rise to the need for reallocations. We hypothesize that one important driver
of reallocation decisions is the firm’s aim to correct systematic deviations from the optimal initial bud-
get that were driven by lobbying during the initial budgeting process. We find evidence that is consis-
tent with this prediction. In a more exploratory analysis, we show that reallocations do not have the
desired effects on market performance. In particular, budget cuts are negatively associated with a prod-
uct’s change in market share. More surprisingly, while budget increases do help product lines achieve
their sales targets in the last quarter, they do not boost market share. Our results demonstrate that
efficient investment planning is essential to achieve an improvement in market performance.
Keywords: budgeting, efficient budget allocation, budget reallocation, rent-seeking
Déterminants et conséquences des réaffectations
de crédits budgétaires
RÉSUMÉ
Les auteurs s’intéressent aux déterminants et aux conséquences des réaffectations de crédits budgétaires
— soit les rectifications apportées au budget en cours d’année. À l’aide de données exclusives à un grand
manufacturier de produits de consommation, ils analysent la mesure dans laquelle les décisions initiales
relatives à l’établissement du budget déterminent les réaffectations. L’étude de ce lien est importante, car
les négociations budgétaires initiales sont souvent teintées par des luttes de pouvoir et des manigances, ce
qui peut engendrer la nécessité de réaffectations ultérieures. Les auteurs posent l’hypothèse selon laquelle
un important vecteur de décisions de réaffectation est la volonté de l’entreprise de redresser les écarts sys-
tématiques par rapport au budget initial optimal qu’a entraîné le lobbyisme pendant le processus initial
d’établissement du budget. Les auteurs relèvent des données qui sont conformes à cette prédiction. Dans
une analyse plus exploratoire, ils montrent que les réaffectations n’ont pas l’incidence espérée sur la perfor-
mance de l’entreprise sur le marché. Les compressions budgétaires affichent notamment un lien négatif avec
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la variation de la part de marché d’un produit. Constatation plus étonnante, bien que les augmentations de
crédits budgétaires contribuent bel et bien à l’atteinte des objectifs de vente des gammes de produits au
dernier trimestre, elles n’élargissent pas la part de marché. Les résultats de l’étude montrent que la
planification efficiente de l’investissement est essentielle à l’amélioration de la performance sur lemarché.
Mots-clés : établissement du budget, affectation efficiente des crédits budgétaires, réaffectation des
crédits budgétaires, recherche de profit
1. Introduction
In light of the increasing uncertainty in the environment and complexity of operations, it is not surprising
that many companies allow for the reallocation of resources across entities during the budget period.
After an initial budget allocation, they update their beliefs about the expected (relative) performance of
the budgeted entities. Given the scarcity of resources, reallocations cannot be made in isolation. Changes
to the budget of one entity typically require the allocations of others to be reconsidered as well.
When managers must decide whose budget to cut to free needed resources, they are confronted with
a trade-off between increasing the opportunities for one entity and hampering those of another. In this
study, we investigate the extent to which management takes the initial budget allocation into account
when making reallocations. In particular, we examine whether decision makers use this opportunity to
try to correct errors made in the initial allocation.While these errors can be caused by a number of factors,
research shows that one important cause is internal power struggles and politicking (Rajan et al. 2000;
Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Wulf 2009). In particular, systematic deviations from the optimal initial allo-
cation (i.e., misallocations) have been shown to be partly due to rent-seeking by “weaker” entities; that is,
those with lower productivity lobby for more resources thanwarranted (Meyer et al. 1992). This behavior
often succeeds, as lower level managers can exploit their informational advantages over top management
regarding performance expectations and growth opportunities of their entities. We argue that one impor-
tant driver of reallocations is the firm’s attempt to correct deviations from the optimal initial
budget allocation that are driven by lobbying during initial budgeting. We expect that, in the presence of
cross-subsidization of weaker entities by stronger ones during initial budgeting, initial misallocations
influence the likelihood of budget cuts in an attempt to achieve a more efficient reallocation. Over the
course of the budgeting period, some of the uncertainties of the initial budget allocation typically resolve.
This increases the likelihood thatmanagement can identify rent-seekers, whose budgets we argue are then
more likely to be cut if resources are needed elsewhere. Although the aim of reallocations is to increase
the efficiency of capital investment, whether this materializes is an open question, which is why we also
explore the performance consequences of budget reallocations.
Using the allocation of the marketing budget among product line managers and proprietary
data from a large consumer goods manufacturer, we apply the allocation method developed by
Fischer et al. (2011) to determine the optimal allocation (share) of marketing investments per
product line as well as deviations from it (i.e., misallocations). A misallocation refers to the frac-
tion of the budget share that is disproportionate to the product line’s growth potential, sales elas-
ticities, and the other characteristics accounted for in the allocation model.
Given that our theory regarding budget reallocations relies on (i) the presence of cross-subsidization
in the initial budget allocation that is (ii) driven by rent-seeking, we first validate these facts in two ways.
First, we show that (i) misallocations, with respect to the optimal allocation rule, indeed consist of system-
atic deviations consistent with cross-subsidization, rather than being random, and that (ii) this cross-
subsidization cannot be explained by the alternative explanation of managers’ cognitive bias for equal
allocation (Bardolet et al. 2011). Second, given that rent-seeking implies that weaker entities are more
likely to be over-allocated and unable to exploit this resource advantage, we hypothesize and show that,
on average, budget over-allocation is negatively associated with the subsequent achievement of sales tar-
gets. Likewise, on average, the more under-allocated entities are, the worse they perform, as they increas-
ingly lack the necessary resources needed to reach their customers. To further corroborate our theoretical
assumptions, we develop a proxy for the productivity (“strength”) of a product line, which captures the
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expected effectiveness of additional marketing investments. This allows us to identify product lines with
a higher likelihood of being rent-seekers (“weak”) and those with a higher likelihood of being subsidizers
(“strong”). We then show that the relation between over- and under-allocation and sales performance is
significantly different for weak versus strong product lines in away consistent with (only) weaker product
lines engaging in rent-seeking.
In our main analysis, we find that—as hypothesized—deviations from the optimal initial bud-
get share drive reallocations but that this effect is asymmetric, at least on average. While initially
over-allocated entities are, on average, indeed more likely to be cut, entities that initially receive
less than the optimal allocations are not more likely to subsequently receive extra resources. Sub-
sequent analysis again shows significant differences between weak and strong product lines in a
way consistent with reallocations being driven by corrections for rent-seeking. However, given
the inability of companies and researchers alike to directly observe rent-seeking behavior, it is
entirely possible that the cross-subsidization we observe in the initial budget allocation is also
driven by additional factors other than rent-seeking. Consequently, additional considerations other
than corrections for successful rent-seeking might also drive reallocation decisions. While we try
to discount alternative explanations with a set of consistent empirical tests, we cannot rule out the
possibility that other drivers of cross-subsidization might (partly) explain our results.
In a more exploratory analysis, we analyze the consequences of budget reallocations for mar-
ket performance. We show that reallocations do not have the desired effects on performance,
which suggests that managers plan on the basis of their initially allocated resources. Receiving
more resources than expected does not make them use this money efficiently with respect to the
external competition. In contrast, managers whose allocations are cut cannot stick to their plans,
which leads to performance decreases.
Although budgeting is one of the most extensively studied topics in management accounting
research, we contribute to this literature by providing insights into a so far unexplored part of the
budgeting process, the determinants and consequences of reallocations during the year. Given
the increasing uncertainty in the macro environment and complexity of firm operations, the initial
budgeting process has become more difficult and more firms appear to allow some flexibility after initial
budgets are set. Examples are the use of flexible and rolling budgets or forecasts to complement the
annual budget (e.g., Merchant and van der Stede 2012). Usually, these tools aim to improve planning and
coordination and ultimately the performance of budgeted entities by incorporating information that
arrives after the annual budget is set. Importantly, the option to incorporate information that becomes
available after the initial budget allocation affects the allocation of a fixed pool of resources, given that
resources are scarce and changes in one entity rebound on others. This triggers two important, yet so far
unexplored, questions. First, what drives reallocations? We contribute to the literature by showing that
one important reason for reallocations is corrections of inefficiencies that occurred during initial
budgeting. Most importantly, we show that reallocations are not just a reaction to the weaker entities’
poor performance but rather to the initial over-allocations per se. This highlights the importance of taking
a dynamic perspective to budgeting in general and gaming behavior in particular. Second, while allowing
some flexibility after initial budgeting is aimed at improving performance, the question remains at to
whether it does. We contribute to the literature by showing that reallocations cannot undo the harm of
poor budgeting. Our results demonstrate that efficient investment planning is essential to improve perfor-
mance, explaining the significant time and money that many firms devote to budgeting. These findings
are consistent with the practitioners’ view that the planning and coordination role of budgets might be
evenmore important than their use for control purposes (Sivabalan et al. 2009).
2. Literature and hypotheses
The budget allocation process
The efficient and effective allocation of resources is one of the most important responsibilities of
(top) managers to maximize firm value. An emerging stream of research on internal capital
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markets has pointed to the difficulties of efficient intra-firm resource allocation as well as the
determinants and consequences of misallocations (Rajan et al. 2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000;
Wulf 2009). In particular, this literature provides insights into the budget negotiations between a
headquarters and its divisions and explains budget allocations among organizational entities. Sev-
eral studies in corporate finance (e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995; Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010) have
documented that multidivisional firms tend to cross-subsidize, that is, they spend “relatively too
much in some divisions, and too little in others” (Scharfstein and Stein 2000, 2538). According
to Scharfstein and Stein (2000), cross-subsidies are prone to be “socialist” in nature, because
stronger entities end up subsidizing weaker ones. Therefore overinvestment in one division has
the consequence of underinvestment in another more profitable division.
In this literature, a common explanation for the subsidization of underperforming entities is
that these deviations from optimal allocation decisions result from managers engaging in rent-
seeking; that is, they lobby the CEO for more resources, compensation, and power (Meyer
et al. 1992). In line with the cross-subsidization argument, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) find that
rent-seeking is mostly undertaken by managers of weaker divisions, as the opportunity costs of
taking time away from productive work is lower for them. Receiving more resources than
warranted helps them achieve their targets, that is, target difficulty decreases.
Rent-seeking often succeeds. Lower level managers have an informational advantage over
top management regarding their divisions’ operating environment and can better assess—and
deliberately overstate—performance expectations and growth opportunities. Thus top manage-
ment lacks both private information on the expected value of the proposed investments as well as
the resources required to carefully audit every request for funds, which is why rent-seeking during
initial budgeting is difficult to detect (Bardolet et al. 2011, 1466).
While some of these uncertainties will resolve over time, the informational advantage of divi-
sion managers is likely to persist. This implies that rent-seeking remains difficult to detect and the
possibility that rent-seekers will not be identified and thus evade potential punishment either in
the current period via a budget cut or via a lower future budget exists.1
Besides the possibility that cross-subsidization is driven by rent-seeking, such systematic deviations
might also be caused by other factors. For example, Bardolet et al. (2011) propose that cross-
subsidization can be observed even in the absence of any agency conflicts. In particular, they argue that
managers have a cognitive, though not necessarily conscious, bias toward an even resource allocation,
implying that benefits and costs are allocated relatively evenly among divisions, irrespective of their
investment opportunities. Consistent with this prediction, they show that the number of divisions and the
relative size of the division within the firm relate to budget allocations, after controlling for measures of
the divisions’ expected productivity. They conclude that cross-subsidization might not only be the result
of stronger entities subsidizing weaker ones, because of rent-seeking, but more generally the result of
subsidization of smaller divisions by larger ones. Finally, while cross-subsidization in general reflects a
systematic deviation from optimal allocations, it is highly likely that there will also be random errors in
initial allocation decisions, due to the inherent uncertainty about investment opportunities (Wulf 2009).
The marketing budget
One category of expenses that must be planned annually is marketing spending. These expenses
include, among others, advertising or media, sales promotions, and physical distribution
(Schwartz 2012). This “marketing portion of the budget considers what resources are to be used,
and in what mix, to move products from the firm to its customers” (Schwartz 2012, 381). The
ultimate impact of marketing expenditures on firm performance is hard to predict and difficult to
1. For example, while management can identify that a division manager has not met performance expectations, it is
often not clear why. For example, it could be due to the weakness of the division per se or due to bad luck or other
external factors. Given that weak entities will try to disguise their weakness (e.g., finding excuses for their short-
comings), management cannot perfectly identify rent-seeking.
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evaluate (Schwartz 2012). Thus, research in marketing suggests that the marketing budgeting is
characterized by social interaction and negotiation (Piercy 1987). Accordingly, the organizational
politicking involved in marketing budgeting is argued “to act as just the type of internal capital
market that organizational theorists have associated with the multidivisional form” of an organiza-
tion (Piercy 1987, 56). Relatedly, previous research on marketing budget decisions shows that the
level of investment does not matter as much as how money is invested (e.g., Tull et al. 1986;
Mantrala et al. 1992; Fischer et al. 2011).
While the accounting and finance literature has dealt at great length with the (capital)
budgeting process in general, marketing researchers have specifically addressed the allocation
process of the marketing budget, and identified its distinctive features. Combining the insights of
these literature streams, we develop hypotheses regarding the determinants of (re)allocations
of the marketing budget.
Hypotheses
Misallocation and rent-seeking of weaker divisions
As discussed above, research has shown that the initial budget allocation is likely to be distorted, in
the sense that stronger entities cross-subsidize weaker ones. In addition to managers’ potential bias for
equal allocation (Bardolet et al. 2011), we argue that misallocations due to cross-subsidization are also
driven by rent-seeking by weaker entities. Given the discretionary nature of the marketing budget,
politicking can be expected to be a natural part of annual budgeting, because managers are given a lot
of opportunity to influence the initial allocation and they can then exploit their informational advan-
tages (Piercy 1987; Bernardo et al. 2004). This implies that, as the result of the initial allocation,
stronger entities are likely to be allocated, on average, a smaller share of the budget than would be
optimal, while weaker ones will receive more than warranted.
This observation has important implications for the entities’ performance during the year.
Cross-subsidized entities, that is, over-allocated entities, are more likely to be less productive
(weaker) types and therefore more likely to perform poorly. In particular, under the assumption
that sales plans do not systematically take the relative strength of entities into account, over-
allocated entities are less likely to achieve their plans, even with relatively more resources,
because they cannot exploit their resource advantage.2 Therefore, a negative association between
a current over-allocation and future sales performance compared to plans is consistent with misal-
locations being driven by cross-subsidization, due to rent-seeking, rather than by random errors
due to uncertainty. Given this expectation, we also expect that over-allocation is associated with
subsequent lower sales performance, as compared to plans.
HYPOTHESIS 1a (H1a). Over-allocation, relative to the optimal initial budget share, is nega-
tively associated with subsequent sales performance as compared to plans.
Under the same assumption that sales plans do not systematically take the strength of
entities into account, the effect of under-allocation on subsequent sales performance is not as
straightforward. On the one hand, it can be argued that under-allocated entities are on average
more productive and more successful and therefore able to outperform their plans, even with
2. This assumption holds in our empirical setting. Specifically, sales plans are set by headquarters prior to the alloca-
tion of the marketing budget, without the involvement of the managers of the “entities,” and the plans are mostly
driven by corporate political pressure—as is typical for firms that face extensive pressures to meet or beat commu-
nicated corporate targets (Feichter et al. 2018). All these factors suggest that the plans do not take into account the
weakness or strength of the entities but rather are anchored on some common corporate target. As a result, all else
equal, sales plans are “too difficult” for weak entities and “too easy” for strong ones. We elaborate more on the pro-
cess of setting sales plans when we describe the empirical setting as well as in our conclusion.
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fewer resources. However, one can also argue that they cannot outperform their plans because
the under-allocation is too severe and they lack the necessary resources. Which effect domi-
nates is an empirical question, and therefore we state the hypothesis in the non-
directional form.
HYPOTHESIS 1b (H1b). Under-allocation, relative to the optimal initial budget share, is associ-
ated with subsequent sales performance as compared to plans.
Determinants of reallocation decisions
In response to increasing uncertainty with respect to competition and customer demands, more
and more companies allow top management to reallocate resources, as they update their beliefs
about relative expected performance. In other words, new information on the entities’ sales and
profits throughout the year can trigger the need for remedies to optimize the bottom line. How-
ever, reacting to a contingency in one entity typically requires changes in another given that
reallocations involve at least two parties. Therefore, reallocation expands to the decision of whose
budgets will need to be cut. We expect that in making this difficult decision management will
take the initial budget allocation into account. During initial budgeting, many decisions must be
made with incomplete information, due to resource constraints and time pressure (Bernardo
et al. 2004), which leads to misallocations caused by, among other factors, rent-seeking. At the
outset, management lacks both private information on the expected value of the proposed invest-
ments as well as the resources to carefully audit every request for funds (Bardolet et al. 2011,
1466). However, we expect that over time some of the uncertainties regarding investment oppor-
tunities resolve, either through observations of realized performance or acquisition of better infor-
mation on expected market developments.3 Thus, in reallocation decisions, management will
attempt to take resources away from managers that have been identified to have overstated their
investment prospects.
One important reason why a potential correction is likely is that the reallocation process
differs substantially from initial budgeting. Reallocations are typically triggered by external
events that require an immediate response. Examples of such events are the unexpected disap-
pearance of a competitor or an unexpected change in customer preferences. Thus, the
response needs to be improvised and the decision whether to reallocate is usually urgent,
which limits the number of lower level managers (i.e., potential rent-seekers) who will be
involved.4 Thus, in contrast to initial budgeting, which is characterized by ongoing negotia-
tions between a large number of self-interested participants (e.g., Hansen et al. 2003; Libby
and Lindsay 2010), reallocations are likely to be executed within a much smaller scope, partly
because of resource constraints. In sum, when management reallocates resources to exploit
arising opportunities and to react to changes in the marketplace, the organizational politicking
will be less pronounced. Consequently, we expect that the decision on which divisions’ bud-
gets to cut to free needed resources is less likely to be affected by lobbying, which makes
budget cuts of weaker entities (typically the rent-seekers) more likely. In particular, we expect
that those entities that received more than optimal resources during the initial allocation are
more likely to have their budgets cut during reallocation in an attempt to correct initial distor-
tions. Given the inherent difficulty of detecting rent-seeking even ex post, we do not expect
3. For example, a manager might have (deliberately) drawn a too pessimistic picture regarding changes in the prefer-
ences of the target customer group to justify extra marketing efforts, but the pessimistic reality never materialized.
4. For example, reallocation decisions at our research site are made by the management committee together with the
controlling department. Product line managers who are in charge of the budgets to be potentially cut are typically
not involved. Further, our discussion with an industry expert also confirms that reallocation decisions are typically
made ad hoc by upper-level management, given their urgency. See also section 3.
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that management will identify every instance. However, we do expect that, in determining
budget cuts, managers will prioritize those entities they have identified as potential rent-
seekers. Following the same logic, we predict that under-allocated entities that received less
budget than they should have are less likely to be cut.5 Stated formally:
HYPOTHESIS 2a (H2a). Over-allocation, relative to the optimal initial budget share, increases
the likelihood of subsequent budget cuts.
HYPOTHESIS 2b (H2b). Under-allocation, relative to the optimal initial budget share, decreases
the likelihood of subsequent budget cuts.
The purpose of reallocations is to increase the efficiency of invested capital, ultimately
increasing overall firm performance. If reallocations do indeed correct, at least partly, initial mis-
allocations, positive performance effects can be expected, particularly for the entities that receive
additional capital. However, the initial misallocations presumably harm performance (Scharfstein
and Stein 2000; Wulf 2009) and it is not clear to what extent subsequent corrections can mitigate
this. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether, and in which direction, budget reallocations
impact the affected entities’ performance. To explore the performance consequences of budget
reallocations, we state the following nondirectional hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3). Budget reallocation is associated with subsequent performance.
3. The research site: ConsumerCo
We conduct a field study with ConsumerCo, one of the divisions of a multinational corporation,
which we refer to as MotherCo, operating in the fast-moving consumer goods industry.6 With its
approximately 30 product lines, ConsumerCo is among the largest divisions of MotherCo. The con-
sumer goods industry is characterized by the substitutability of its products. Therefore, it is a
marketing-driven industry, making market and media presence a top priority. ConsumerCo spends
about 50% of yearly net sales on marketing to maintain or increase the market share of its product
lines and to keep pace with fierce competition. Consequently, the market share of each division is an
important measurement tool for overall firm performance, compared to competitors. Not surprisingly,
marketing is the largest yearly expenditure of ConsumerCo and has a marked effect on the bottom
line. The marketing budget is also used as a performance monitoring tool for the division. Frequent
evaluations of budgeted versus actual expenses are performed, and budget reallocations are executed
when necessary.7
The budgeting process
Figure 1 illustrates the initial budgeting process (panel A) as well as the marketing budget
reallocation process (panel B).
5. To be complete, the same reasoning applies when money becomes available. That is, initially under-allocated enti-
ties will be assigned more of the surplus capital. This scenario is, however, less likely, given that we expect that the
trigger for reallocations is capital demand, rather than capital surplus.
6. The information presented in this section is based on discussions with the managing director, the head of control-
ling, and business controllers of ConsumerCo as well as secondary documents received from ConsumerCo.
7. A discussion with a consumer goods industry expert at one of the largest global media agencies worldwide con-
firmed that the marketing budgeting at our research site represents the state-of-the art in the consumer goods indus-
try, rather than being an exception.
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The initial marketing budget is determined in the course of the annual sales budgeting pro-
cess of MotherCo, in which sales and profit plans as well as the corresponding marketing budgets
are set.8 Budgeting begins at least three months before the start of the next fiscal year. In the first step,
sales and profit plans are set in a top-down process from headquarters. MotherCo first sets top-line
sales and profit plans at the corporate level, which are then broken down to division sales and profit
plans and further broken down to the individual product lines, which is our unit of analysis.
According to our discussions, division management of ConsumerCo has very little influence on its
final sales and profit plans. As the head of controlling stated, “We can make recommendations and
are involved in the discussions, but, in the end, the political pressure (from headquarters) will set the
targets.” Product line managers are not at all involved in the sales and profit planning process.
Once the sales and profit plans are set, MotherCo communicates the annual sales plans. Based on
these plans, the divisional marketing budget is then developed via iterations between headquarters and
the division. The level of the marketing budget for the division, that is, the size of the pie, is negotiated
between headquarters and division management. Based on input gathered from product line managers,
the division’s controlling department, in cooperation with the managing director of the division, develops
an initial suggestion for the marketing budget, which is then negotiated with headquarters. Once the level
of the overall marketing budget for the division has been determined, the individual marketing budgets
per product line, that is, the allocation of the pie, is negotiated between division management and prod-
uct line managers. MotherCo does not participate in the budget allocations to the different product lines
within a division. Based on input from product line managers during this latter step, renegotiations
between headquarters and division management regarding the size of the pie can occur. Once this pro-
cess is finalized, the final marketing budget is then proposed to headquarters for approval.
After approval from MotherCo, the spending level per product line is normally fixed. Nevertheless,
the managing director of ConsumerCo, together with the controlling department, can request shifts
between the budgets of the different product lines (i.e., reallocations) during the year. Although such
changes do not affect the level of the divisional marketing budget, they still need to be approved by
MotherCo, which, as our discussions confirm, is a formality. Reallocations not only enable the exploita-
tion of arising opportunities and responses to changes in the marketplace but also help optimize the divi-
sion’s bottom line. Note that the sales plan is used as a performance monitoring tool for the division, and
the division’s controlling department plays an important role in this process. The business controllers per-
form frequent, sometimes even weekly, evaluations of product line performance, that is, they closely
monitor the firm’s three most important key performance indicators—market share, net sales, and prod-
uct line profit—as well as track budgeted versus actual marketing expenses.
Performance evaluation and incentives
The management committee of ConsumerCo has explicit incentive contracts based on sales target
achievement at the aggregate division level. While there are no explicit performance targets linked
to the achievement of the profit targets, these are considered in the overall evaluation of the man-
agement committee’s performance. This implies that members of the division’s management com-
mittee have incentives to ensure an efficient budget allocation and reallocation to maximize the
division’s (sales) performance and, in turn, their own compensation. Product line managers do not
have explicit incentives based on the achievement of the sales plans for their respective product
lines. However, this is an important component of the evaluation of the product line manager’s per-
formance at year-end and one of the most important factors in promotion decisions.
Field evidence regarding rent-seeking and its role in reallocations
Given the difficulty of capturing rent-seeking, we provide qualitative evidence to supplement our quanti-
tative analyses and corroborate our theory. Our discussions confirm that product line managers indeed
8. While the market share at all different levels of aggregation is considered the most important performance indicator
(KPI), no explicit targets are set, as these are implicitly captured by the sales plans.
10 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. 00 No. 00 (Month 2021)
have incentives to rent-seek. They, in effect, have no influence on their sales targets, so the only way to
make targets easier is to obtain a greater allocation of marketing resources. Thus they have incentives to
lobby for excess resources, especially when sales targets are more difficult because they are weaker enti-
ties. It is also worth mentioning that a product line’s bottom line is typically not considered in perfor-
mance evaluations and promotion decisions, which implies that product line managers are not bearing
the consequences of higher marketing budgets being allocated to them.
Our discussions describe budget reallocation as a balancing act between the product line port-
folio’s market share, net sales, and profit performance. To achieve balance across product lines,
the initial budget allocation is updated. Our discussions additionally reveal that the most impor-
tant trigger for budget increases is the response to unexpected competitor activities, as these most
directly influence market share. Information about these activities is not initially available, and
adjustments to the budget therefore happen over the course of the business year, with an aim of
keeping up with competitors.
Regarding decisions on which budgets to cut to free needed resources, the first thing that the
management committee considers is changes to a product line’s profitability, which are best reflected
in changes in the ratio of sales-to-date performance to marketing costs. Thus, if profitability drops,
the marketing budget is shifted away from the underperforming product lines to safeguard the
targeted bottom line. Our discussions also confirm that the initial budget allocation is indeed factored
into the decision of which budgets to cut. In particular, product lines that, in hindsight, received “too
much” budget will be cut to restore the balance described above. When asked to describe how “too
much” is defined, two things were mentioned: (i) too much as compared to realized sales-to-date per-
formance and (ii) too much as compared to the realization of expected external forces such as
expected competitor actions or changes to customer preferences, both of which are in line with our
expectations underlying H2a and H2b.
While product line managers are heavily involved in the initial budget allocation, reallocation deci-
sions are typically made by the management committee, in cooperation with the controlling department.
Most importantly, while product line managers might approach the management committee for extra
resources, once new information about competitor activities arrives, product line managers are typically
not involved in the decisions on which budgets to cut to free resources. Thus it is safe to say that
reallocation is much less affected by politicking than initial budgeting, consistent with the premise of
H2a andH2b.
Sample, data, and measures
The data cover the period from 2007 to 2010, resulting in 122 product line–year observations for the
four years. For each product line, we gathered budget as well as actual data for the following variables:
net sales (less returns), contribution margin, and total marketing expenditures. Moreover, we received
actual data on market shares and quarterly net sales at the product line level for the period of 2006 until
2010. Further, the marketing director rated the degree of competition per product line, resulting in an
indicator variable for high versus low competition. We also collected data on launches within a product
line or launches of entirely new product lines occurring during each year. Based on historical sales
growth and a subjective classification by the marketing director with respect to each product line’s
stage in the product life cycle, we classify each product as being either in the growth or maturity stage.
4. Empirical design
Marketing budget allocation: The near-optimal allocation rule
To determine the optimal share of the marketing budget per product line, we rely on the allocation
method developed by Fischer et al. (2011), which optimally allocates a fixed marketing budget among a
diverse product portfolio. The optimal allocation rule maximizes the discounted total profits of the portfo-
lio. More importantly, Fischer et al. (2011) develop a near-optimal allocation rule that is easy to imple-
ment and, as they show using a simulation, converges to the optimal solution under varying conditions.
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Given that their context of a fixed marketing budget and a diverse product portfolio fits with our setting,
we follow their approach to determine the near-optimal shares of the marketing budget. The allocation
rule incorporates information about (i) the size of the product line, (ii) the contribution margin, (iii) the
(long-term) effectiveness of marketing investments, (iv) the growth potential, and (v) the time value of
money.9 A full description of the allocation rule, its assumptions, and its application to our setting are
reported in the online Appendix.10
Measures of budget misallocation and reallocation
We use the near-optimal share of the marketing budget to develop variables associated with the
over- or under-allocation of the initial marketing budget induced by other factors not included in,
and consequently not explained by, the economic optimal solution. Specifically, we use the differ-
ence between the budgeted share of total marketing expenditure of product line i of product-
category k at time t and the near-optimal share of product line i of product-category k at time t as a
proxy for the misallocated marketing budget at the product line level in a given year (MIS-
ALLOCATIONikt). Second, we separate the over-allocation of marketing expenditures from the
under-allocation by creating two variables based on MISALLOCATIONikt. %OVERALLOCATIONikt
(%UNDERALLOCATIONikt) equals MISALLOCATIONikt (1  MISALLOCATIONikt) if
MISALLOCATIONikt is positive (negative) and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, during the business year, new information on profitability and growth opportu-
nities of the product lines may arise. As a consequence, reallocations in the budget and therefore
marketing investment may occur. While MISALLOCATIONikt represents the impact of factors
other than those included in the near-optimal solution on ex ante budget allocation decisions,
%REALLOCATIONikt reflects changes to the share of marketing expenditures ex post. Consistent with
the variables for ex ante misallocation, we measure%REALLOCATIONikt as the difference between the
actual share of marketing expenditures at year-end and the initial budgeted share of marketing expendi-
tures received. We further define IND_SHARECUTikt as an indicator variable set equal to one for obser-
vations for which%REALLOCATIONikt is negative, indicating a budget share cut.
5. Results
Descriptives
The descriptive statistics, presented in Table 1, show the following noteworthy results. The budgeted
share of the marketing budget (BUDGETSHARE) that a product line on average receives is 3.25%,
while the maximum share is less than 20%, which indicates that there is not a single product line that
dominates the budget. A similar pattern is observed for the near-optimal share, with an average of
3.28% and a maximum of less than 26%. Furthermore, 38.52% of the product line–year observations
contain over-allocations, which indicates that, although under-allocations are more likely, over-
allocations are larger when they occur.11 The reallocations during the year (%REALLOCATION)
9. The extent to which the near-optimal allocation rule correctly captures the optimal budget shares crucially depends on
whether the input factors (parameters) are correct. Of particular importance for our empirical analysis is that the parameters
we need to estimate, are unbiased estimates of the parameters that are available to the firm when they plan the marketing
investments. Supporting Information in the Online Appendix provides a detailed explanation and substantiation of our esti-
mated parameters. Some of the parameters do not have to be estimated because they come directly from the firm’s informa-
tion system and these are thus free from measurement error by the researcher. It is of course possible that this information
itself is not fully correct. For example, contribution margins, which were provided to us, can be influenced by discretionary
variable cost allocations. If these allocations do not correctly capture the underlying process, the near-optimal allocation rule
also does not correctly capture the “real” optimal budget shares. Even though this type of measurement error is possible, it
neither affects our empirical analysis nor our inferences. As stated before, what is important for our study is that the parame-
ters we use, reflect the parameters that are available to the firmwhen they plan themarketing investments, which is by defini-
tion the case for the parameters that were provided by the firm.
10. Please see supporting information, as an addition to the online article.
11. This conclusion follows from the fact that the misallocations sum up to zero and are thus on average zero.
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range from a share cut of 2.31% to a share boost of 5.22%, which is significant given the average
share of the marketing budget allocated to product lines. Moreover, none of the correlations between
the independent variables used in our analysis (untabulated) cause multicollinearity concerns.
Initial analysis of misallocations
In section 2, we provided a number of reasons for why the share of the marketing budget allocated to
a product line might deviate from the optimum. There could be random error due to information
asymmetry, cognitive bias in favor of naïve diversification, or rent-seeking. Or there could be a com-
bination of these factors. First, we examine whether naïve diversification drives budget allocation
decisions in our setting. An allocation based on naïve diversification implies a cognitive bias toward
spreading resources over all product lines more evenly than would be dictated by the optimal alloca-
tion of resources—specifically, a bias toward an allocation that equals 1/n, with n being the number
of product lines (Bardolet et al. 2011). Under the assumption that an unbiased allocation should take
the relative size of a product line into account in the allocation decision (Bardolet et al. 2011), in the
sense that larger lines should get a larger share, a bias toward an allocation that equals 1/n automati-
cally implies that larger lines are at a disadvantage. As a result, if an allocation based on naïve diver-
sification is at play, then the allocation is positively related to 1/n and, conditional on this, negatively
related to the relative size of the product line. We closely follow Bardolet et al. (2011) and estimate
TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics
n Mean SD Min. Max.
BUDGETSHARE 122 0.0325 0.0467 0 0.1993
OPTIMALSHARE 122 0.0328 0.0489 0 0.2572
IND_OVERALLOCATION 122 0.3852 0.4887 0 1
%OVERALLOCATION 122 0.0075 0.0145 0 0.0638
%UNDERALLOCATION 122 0.0078 0.0165 0 0.0802
IND_SHARECUT 122 0.4098 0.4938 0 1
%REALLOCATION 122 0.0003 0.0090 0.0231 0.0522
NPL 122 30 3 26 34
SHARE_EQUAL 122 0.0340 0.0033 0.0294 0.0385
SHARE_SIZE 122 0.0328 0.0461 0 0.2081
NEWPL 122 0.0738 0.2625 0 1
LCYCLE 122 0.1885 0.3927 0 1
B_CM% 122 0.4687 0.2478 0 0.7410
CH_CM% 122 0.0908 0.2303 0.2344 0.8976
COMP 122 0.6721 0.4714 0 1
LMSHARE 122 0.0422 0.0681 0 0.2511
LAUNCH 122 0.4016 0.4923 0 1
Q1_PERF_YTD 122 0.2468 0.9151 1 5.7110
Q2_PERF_YTD 122 0.2089 0.8145 1 4.9302
Q3_PERF_YTD 122 0.1617 0.7587 1 4.9744
Q4_PERF_YTD 122 0.0994 0.7549 1 4.6781
CH_MSHARE 122 0.0009 0.0095 0.0361 0.0651
Q4_SALESPERF 122 0.0493 0.9473 5.296 4.824
%SHAREBOOST 122 0.0028 0.0065 0 0.0522
%SHARECUT 122 0.0025 0.0049 0 0.0231
%LEVELBOOST 122 0.4512 0.7321 0 3.5087
%LEVELCUT 122 0.0989 0.2062 0 1
TV 122 0.4936 0.5018 0 1
Notes: See the Appendix for variable definitions.
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model (1) to test whether naïve diversification is driving the allocation of the marketing budget in
our setting (see the online Appendix for a formal derivation of this equation).
BUDGETSHARE¼ β0þβ1OPTIMALSHAREþβ2SHARE_EQUALþβ3SHARE_SIZEþμ, ð1Þ
where OPTIMALSHARE is the near-optimal share, SHARE_EQUAL is 1/n, and SHARE_SIZE is
the product line’s sales in year t  1 divided by the sum of all product lines’ sales in year t  1.
For naïve diversification to be present, a necessary condition is that β2 > 0. If the relative size
argument also holds, then the additional condition is that β3 < 0.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of estimating model (1), both without including the relative
size of the product line and including it. We find that, while the near-optimal share (OPTIMALSHARE)
is positive and significant in both regressions, as expected, the variable SHARE_EQUAL is not signifi-
cant in both regressions. We thus fail to find evidence in favor of the necessary condition for the pres-
ence of naïve diversification. In addition, the coefficient on SHARE_SIZE is positive and significant,
which is contrary to the expectation of naïve diversification via relative size.12 In sum, we find no evi-
dence that the allocation of the marketing budget is being driven by naïve diversification, which allows
us to rule out that the results of our upcoming analyses are so driven.
TABLE 2
Pattern of budget misallocation
Panel A: Test whether budget allocation is driven by naïve diversification (cf. Bardolet et al. 2011)















Product-category fixed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.866 0.878
n 122 122
Panel B: Average misallocation for different levels of productivity (with 5 being the highest level)
CAT_ PRODUCTIVITY
1 2 3 4 5a
MISALLOCATION 0.14% 0.33% 0.56% 0.02% 1.19%
Notes: Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., “(+)” or “()”) in case the
estimated sign is consistent with the predicted sign and two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors in brackets are
adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. See the Appendix for variable definitions. aOnly cate-
gory 5 is significantly different from all other categories (p < 0.10 two-tailed or better). * and *** represent
significance levels of 0.10 and 0.01, respectively.
12. The positive coefficient can be explained by the observation that lagged actual sales correlate with currently planned
sales, with the latter being part of the near-optimal allocation rule, that is, OPTIMALSHARE. The small drop in the
coefficient on OPTIMALSHARE is consistent with this interpretation, and, more importantly, this interpretation
comports with naïve diversification not playing a role in our setting.
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Ruling out naïve diversification does not, however, imply that rent-seeking is at play. To
provide initial evidence for the presence of rent-seeking, we focus on the rent-seeking predic-
tion that cross-subsidization relates systematically to “productivity.” In particular, theory pre-
dicts that rent-seeking occurs for weak product lines, that is, those with productivity below
some threshold, leading to an over-allocation, while product lines above the threshold
(“strong”) are used to cross-subsidize and are thus under-allocated. We therefore examine
how misallocations are distributed over different levels of productivity. To create these sub-
groups of productivity, we exploit the fact that the theory of optimal allocation predicts that,
all else equal, more productive product lines should be allocated a greater share of the
resources. For example, all else equal, product lines with greater marketing effectiveness
should receive a greater share. Similarly, all else equal, product lines with greater growth
potential should receive a greater share. Given that all these productivity components mono-
tonically increase the near-optimal share, it follows that subgroups based on our measure of
the near-optimal share by construction overlap with subgroups based on (unobserved) produc-
tivity.13 As a result, we split the near-optimal share in quintiles and examine the average mis-
allocation of each quintile. First, the results presented in panel B of Table 2 show that
misallocations increase from the first to the third quintile and drop after that. Second, the
average misallocation is positive in quintiles 1–4 and negative in quintile 5, which implies
that there is on average an over-allocation in quintiles 1–4 and an under-allocation in quintile 5.
Third, the over-allocation is marginally significantly different from zero in quintiles 2 and 3
(p = 0.11 and p = 0.02 two-tailed, respectively), while the under-allocation in quintile 5 is not
significantly different from zero (p = 0.19 two-tailed). Finally, while the average misallocation
is not significantly different among the first four quintiles, all four differ significantly from quin-
tile 5 (p < 0.10 two-tailed or better).
Overall, these results show that the pattern of misallocations is not random. More impor-
tantly, while the pattern does not provide evidence of rent-seeking per se, it is consistent with the
rent-seeking prediction that misallocations are a function of productivity. The highest quintile is
clearly distinct from the rest and, if the rent-seeking story holds, most likely represents the
absence of rent-seeking, that is, product lines that are used for cross-subsidization. We use this
observation to create an indicator variable for “high productivity,” which allows for more specific
tests of our rent-seeking hypotheses.
Misallocation and rent-seeking of weaker divisions (H1a and H1b)
H1 predicts that budget misallocations regarding the initial budget are associated with subsequent




where the dependent variable is Q1_PERF_YTD, Q2_PERF_YTD, or Q3_PERF_YTD, rep-
resenting year-to-date performance regarding sales after each of the first three quarters.14 That is,
for each quarter, we compare the sales to date to the sales plan to date, and measure percentage
differences.15 Consistent with H1a, we argue that, on average, over-allocations are negatively
13. See the online Appendix for a formal derivation.
14. The timing of the measurement of year-to-date performance is based on discussions with the head of controlling,
indicating that most reallocations happen in the second half of the year and preferably, at the latest, after the third
quarter to allow the reallocations an opportunity to affect performance in the current year. Therefore only the first
three quarters allow for a clean test of H1.
15. In measuring sales plan to date, we create quarterly sales plans by dividing the annual sales plan equally over
the year. The equal divide seems reasonable in our empirical setting, and an additional seasonality test
confirms this.
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associated with year-to-date performance (β1 < 0), while per H1b we have a nondirectional predic-
tion for under-allocations (β2). In all models, we control for the product line’s stage in the product
life cycle (LCYCLE), with the variable equaling one when a product line is in the growth stage
and zero when it is in the maturity stage. We add another indicator variable accounting for the
impact of a launch within a product line. LAUNCH equals one in the case of at least one launch
in the product line at time t and zero otherwise. Similarly, a launch may not only represent one
new product added to a product line but the launch of a whole new line. To account for this, we
include an indicator variable for the launch of a new product line: NEWPL equals one if a new
line is launched in a product category and zero otherwise. We further control for the natural log
of the lagged market share of the product line (LMSHARE) and the degree of competition in the
market for the product line, where COMP equals one if the degree of competition in the product
line’s market is high and zero otherwise. Finally, we include B_CM%, which is the budgeted con-
tribution margin percentage of the product line. We also include year and product-category fixed
effects and cluster the standard errors by product line.
The results are reported in Table 3. Consistent with our expectation, we find evidence that
initially over-allocated products are less likely to achieve their sales plans. In particular, β1 is neg-
ative and significant in all models, providing evidence in favor of H1a. Most importantly, initially
over-allocated products begin performing worse after the first quarter, suggesting that weaker enti-
ties are indeed more likely to be over-allocated and unable to exploit this advantage. Regarding
under-allocation, β2 is also significantly negative. This implies that under-allocated entities are, on
TABLE 3




Intercept 0.801 0.580 0.786
[0.753] [0.674] [0.723]
%OVERALLOCATION () 12.450** 12.968*** 11.320**
[6.336] [5.222] [5.126]
%UNDERALLOCATION 17.323** 15.327** 12.325*
[7.871] [7.078] [7.061]
NEWPL 0.677** 0.423 0.371
[0.326] [0.270] [0.289]
LCYCLE 0.085 0.098 0.040
[0.198] [0.179] [0.162]
B_CM% 2.375* 1.692 1.532
[1.263] [1.150] [1.182]
LMSHARE 8.471*** 6.951*** 5.116**
[2.390] [2.039] [2.164]
LAUNCH 0.439** 0.339** 0.313**
[0.189] [0.155] [0.142]
COMP 0.239 0.254 0.207
[0.199] [0.160] [0.155]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product-category fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.229 0.195
N 122 122 122
Notes: Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., “(+)” or “()”) and two-tailed
otherwise. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. See the Appendix
for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
16 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. 00 No. 00 (Month 2021)
average, not able to outperform their plan due to being disadvantaged from a resource allocation
perspective.
To provide more evidence in favor of the rent-seeking argument, we create an indicator vari-
able based on the productivity grouping that reflects a propensity toward rent-seeking. Based on
the results in panel B of Table 2, we create the indicator variable H_PROD that equals one if the
near-optimal share of the marketing budget of a product line is in quintile 5 and zero otherwise.
As discussed before, if the rent-seeking story holds, then this highest quintile most likely repre-
sents the absence of rent-seeking. If rent-seeking of weaker entities is indeed present, we expect
that the impact of %OVERALLOCATION on year-to-date performance will be more negative for
H_PROD = 0, as compared to H_PROD = 1. This is because an over-allocation of a high-
productivity product line is more likely to be driven by random errors and therefore expected to
dampen sales performance to a lesser extent, if at all. In addition, in developing H1b, we stated
that there can be two offsetting effects of an under-allocation. On the one hand, the under-
allocation creates a resource disadvantage that hurts performance, while on the other hand, the
under-allocated entities might be productive enough to counteract this disadvantage, resulting in a
smaller performance decrease, or even no decrease at all. We thus also expect that the impact of
%UNDERALLOCATION on year-to-date performance is more negative for H_PROD = 0, as





We find evidence consistent with our rent-seeking expectations, as shown in Table 4. Specifi-
cally, we find that β1, which is the coefficient for product lines where H_PROD = 0, is negative
and significant in all three quarters. Most importantly, we find that the interaction coefficient β3 is
marginally significantly positive in all three quarters, which implies that the negative association
between %OVERALLOCATION and year-to-date performance is significantly smaller for product
lines where H_PROD = 1. The sum of the coefficients of β1 and β3, which reflects the coefficient
of %OVERALLOCATION for product lines where H_PROD = 1, is not significantly different
from zero (untabulated).
Regarding %UNDERALLOCATION, we find a similar pattern. That is, we find that β2 is neg-
ative and significant in all three quarters, while the interaction coefficient β4 is marginally signifi-
cantly positive. These results imply that under-allocation is negatively associated with
performance for weak entities but less so for stronger ones. Regarding the latter, we find that the
sum of the coefficients of β2 and β4 is not significantly different from zero (untabulated), which
implies that under-allocation is not associated with performance for strong product lines.
In sum, the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 supports H1a as well as the arguments underlying the
development of H1b. In particular, we provide evidence consistent with rent-seeking driving mis-
allocations of the marketing budget.
Determinants of budget reallocations (H2a and H2b)
H2a and H2b predict that misallocation regarding the initial budget drives subsequent reallocation
decisions (IND_SHARECUT or %REALLOCATION). In particular, we expect that budgets for
over-allocated product lines are more likely to be cut, while the opposite holds for initially under-
allocated ones. To test these predictions, we estimate the determinants of budget reallocations by
using model (2) defined before but where the dependent variable is IND_SHARECUTikt or
%REALLOCATIONikt.
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In addition to the control variables used before, we further control for Q3_PERF_YTD in
analyzing budget reallocation decisions. Uncertainty regarding investment opportunities can be
resolved through observing realized sales performance, which might reveal potential over-
allocations in the initial budget that, as we expect, will be addressed in reallocation decisions.
Thus observed sales-to-date performance is an important trigger for reallocations. Controlling for
performance during the year allows us to isolate the direct effect of initial misallocations on
reallocation decisions beyond its effect through realized sales performance. For similar reasons,
we also replace the budgeted contribution margin by the difference between the actual and
budgeted contribution margin (CH_CM%).
The results regarding IND_SHARECUT, reported in column (1) of Table 5, provide evidence
that product lines allocated a larger share of the marketing budget than the near-optimal share are
significantly more likely to be cut during the year (β1 > 0). Surprisingly, we find that the adjust-
ments are asymmetric, because initially under-allocated products are, on average, not less likely to
TABLE 4





Intercept 0.864 0.602 0.837
[0.809] [0.735] [0.796]
%OVERALLOCATION () 15.459** 15.858** 14.562**
[7.924] [6.933] [6.856]
%UNDERALLOCATION () 28.782** 23.342** 19.089*
[15.301] [13.164] [12.716]
%OVERALLOCATIONH_PROD (+) 12.812* 12.688* 11.842*
[9.712] [8.093] [7.230]
%UNDERALLOCATIONH_PROD (+) 20.126* 16.654* 13.325*
[12.162] [10.309] [9.418]
H_PROD 0.421 0.454* 0.328
[0.286] [0.242] [0.205]
NEWPL 0.731** 0.485 0.409
[0.351] [0.298] [0.313]
LCYCLE 0.047 0.056 0.007
[0.198] [0.175] [0.160]
B_CM% 2.347* 1.649 1.519
[1.271] [1.168] [1.200]
LMSHARE 8.199*** 6.808*** 4.804**
[1.969] [1.690] [1.989]
LAUNCH 0.445** 0.327** 0.309**
[0.197] [0.158] [0.147]
COMP 0.243 0.275* 0.231
[0.192] [0.162] [0.154]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Product-category fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.244 0.207
N 122 122 122
Notes: Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., “(+)” or “()”) and
two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over
time. See the Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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be cut (β2 is not significant in explaining IND_SHARECUT). We observe a similar pattern of results
in column (2) of Table 5. That is, %OVERALLOCATION is significantly negatively associated with
%REALLOCATION, while %UNDERALLOCATION is not significantly associated with %RE-
ALLOCATION. This implies the likelihood of a budget being cut is not only associated with the
extent to which a product line is over-allocated but also the size of the cut. Last, both models show
that the likelihood and magnitude of budget share cuts increase with decreasing Q3_PERF_YTD
and CH_CM%, consistent with performance being associated with reallocation decisions.
To provide more evidence in favor of the rent-seeking argument, we again examine whether
the productivity of a product line affects the relation between initial misallocations and
reallocations. Specifically, we run model (3) with IND_SHARECUT or %REALLOCATION as the
dependent variable and Q3_PERF_YTD and CH_CM% as additional control variables. The
results for IND_SHARECUT, presented in column (1) of Table 6, show a pattern consistent with
initial rent-seeking playing a role in budget reallocation decisions. Specifically, we find that β1 is
significantly positive and β3 is significantly negative. This implies that for less productive product
lines, which are more likely to rent-seek, the likelihood of a budget cut is higher the higher the
over-allocation. However, this effect is significantly less present for more productive product
lines, which are less likely to rent-seek. The sum of the coefficients of β1 and β3, which reflects
TABLE 5
Budget reallocations as a function of deviations from the optimal initial budget share
Variables
(1) (2)
Pred. sign IND_SHARECUT Pred. sign %REALLOCATION
Intercept 3.269*** 0.007
[1.244] [0.008]
%OVERALLOCATION (+) 37.622*** () 0.235**
[16.150] [0.119]
















Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Product-category fixed effects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.394 0.255
N 122 122
Notes: Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., “(+)” or “()”) and two-
tailed otherwise. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. See
the Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01,
respectively.
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the coefficient of %OVERALLOCATION for product lines where H_PROD = 1, is not signifi-
cantly different from zero (untabulated). That is, budgets for highly productive product lines that
are over-allocated are not more likely to be cut, consistent with these over-allocations being most
likely driven by random errors that are least likely to be penalized.
Regarding under-allocations and IND_SHARECUT, we find that β2, the coefficient for prod-
uct lines where H_PROD = 0, is not significant, while the interaction coefficient β4 is signifi-
cantly negatively. We additionally find that the sum of the coefficients of β2 and β4, which
captures the coefficient for product lines where H_PROD = 1, is significantly negative. These
results imply that, for less productive product lines, being under-allocated does not lower the like-
lihood of being cut, while for more productive product lines, being under-allocated does lower
the likelihood. These findings comport with reallocation decisions considering the initial
TABLE 6




Pred. sign IND_SHARECUT Pred. sign %REALLOCATION
Intercept 3.543*** 0.006
[1.095] [0.008]
%OVERALLOCATION (+) 47.022*** () 0.277**
[17.638] [0.115]
%UNDERALLOCATION () 17.019 (+) 0.079
[16.887] [0.067]
%OVERALLOCATIONH_PROD () 36.903** (+) 0.110
[19.530] [0.213]


















Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Product-category fixed effects Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.417 0.267
N 122 122
Notes: Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., “(+)” or “()”) and
two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over
time. See the Appendix for variable definitions. ** and *** represent significance levels of 0.05 and
0.01, respectively.
20 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. 00 No. 00 (Month 2021)
allocation decision and especially the underlying rent-seeking; budgets for over-allocated rent-
seekers are more likely to be cut, while those for under-allocated “cross-subsidizers” are less
likely to be cut. The results in column (2) of Table 6 regarding the size of the reallocation, that
is, %REALLOCATION, do not show any significant interaction effects.
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 confirm that managers indeed take the initial
budget allocation into account when deciding on reallocations during the year, over and above
the changes in expectations with respect to sales and profit performance. In particular, we find
strong evidence for H2a, as initial over-allocation is, on average, associated with subsequent bud-
get cuts, and significantly more so for less productive product lines, which are more likely to
rent-seek. While we do not find an average effect of under-allocation on budget share cuts, we do
show that under-allocation lowers the probability of a budget cut for more productive product
lines, which provides evidence for H2b.
Performance consequences of budget reallocations (H3)
The reason why firms redistribute the initially allocated budget is their assumption that
reallocations will either increase performance of the entities that receive an additional share of the
budget or mitigate the losses of entities by managing profits via cuts in the share of expenses.
However, it is an empirical question whether, and in which direction, budget reallocations affect
performance. To illuminate this issue, we perform an exploratory analysis to investigate the con-
sequences of budget reallocations for two different types of performance measures, the annual
change in market share as an externally oriented measure of market performance and sales perfor-
mance in the final quarter as an internally oriented measure of sales plan achievement.16 In partic-




where the dependent variable is the annual change in market share (CH_MSHARE) or sales
performance in the final quarter (Q4_SALESPERF). We measure CH_MSHARE as the per-
centage point change in market share from the previous to the current year. Q4_SALESPERF
is measured as the percentage deviation of the realized sales from the planned sales in the last
quarter, before the start of which all reallocations have happened. Our main independent vari-
ables, %BOOST and %CUT, capture the budget reallocations, each of which we measure in
two different ways. First, we examine the change in the budget share, relative to the other
product lines, as captured by the previously defined variable %REALLOCATION, which we
use to test our main hypothesis.17 We separate budget share boosts from budget share cuts by cre-
ating two variables based on %REALLOCATION. %SHAREBOOST (%SHARECUT) equals %RE-
ALLOCATION (1  %REALLOCATION) if %REALLOCATION is positive (negative) and zero
otherwise.
In the case of the total budgeted marketing expenses equaling the total actual spending level,
changes to a product line’s budget share directly translate into the corresponding changes to the
16. We focus on sales performance in the fourth quarter as reallocations are typically conducted in the second half of
the year but no later than the end of the third quarter. We do so to ensure that the reallocations can still possibly
have an effect in the same year.
17. From an efficiency perspective, the conceptually correct variable to measure reallocations is the change in the share,
relative to the other product lines. That is, efficiency is about how the resources are allocated. Thus our focus in the
theory development and the analysis of H2 is on the share of the pie that a product line had initially versus the share
after the reallocation. The goal is the most efficient exploitation of investment opportunities at the firm level, and
thus the budget of one product line, relative to the other product lines, matters. From an efficiency point of view,
which is our focus, it does not matter whether the pie changes.
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product line’s budget level (in monetary terms), given that the “pie” remains constant; that is,
reallocations are a zero-sum game. However, at our research site, the total actual spending level
ex post can differ from the total budget level ex ante, which changes the total pie to be allocated.
Thus, either extra resources might become available for allocation during the year or the market-
ing expenditures allocated to ConsumerCo are reduced.18 To capture the separate effect of actual
changes to the budget level, we create separate variables capturing the degree to which product
lines actually are cut or receive additional money. We measure %LEVELCHANGE as the realized
marketing expenditures (in €) minus the budgeted marketing expenditures (in €), scaled by the
budget. As with the budget share reallocations, we then separate budget boosts from budget cuts
by creating two variables based on %LEVELCHANGE. %LEVELBOOST (%LEVELCUT) equals
%LEVELCHANGE (1%LEVELCHANGE) if %LEVELCHANGE is positive (negative) and
zero otherwise.
Besides the control variables used in the previous models, we also add the indicator variable
TV, assuming the value of one when the product line is advertised via TV commercials and zero
otherwise. We control for year and product-category fixed effects and cluster the standard errors
by product line.
The results are reported in Table 7. In line with the firm’s intentions, a budget boost in
terms of share or level during the year is positively associated with reaching internal sales plans
in the last quarter. However, neither of these is associated with an annual change in market
share, the ultimate indicator of product line success. These results suggest that managers plan
based on the resources they initially are allocated and thus receiving more resources than
expected does not induce them to use this money efficiently. The fact that budget boosts do
support sales plan achievement but do not seem to translate internal sales performance into
external market performance is remarkable, given that the ultimate goal of reallocations is to
optimize market share. This specifically implies that, to the extent that budget boosts are used
to exploit emerging market opportunities, managers seem unable to use the additional resources
to outperform competitors. Regarding budget cuts, %SHARECUT is not associated with either
performance measure. More relevant, while %LEVELCUT is not associated with sales relative
to plan, it is negatively associated with the annual change in market share. This suggests that
unexpected budget cuts during the year interfere with the marketing strategy the product line
managers had conceived, implying that those whose budgets were cut cannot stick to their
plans, which leads to their being outperformed by competitors. In sum, our results suggest that,
while budget reallocations do seem to overall improve internal sales performance, they show an
overall negative association with external market performance.19 That is, as soon as competition is
taken into account, the reallocations seem to fail to achieve their goal. In an attempt to achieve a more
efficient budget via reallocations, managers distort operations even more, making the reallocations ex
post inefficient.
18. Several conditions can cause this change in the total spending level. ConsumerCo has a corporate account that
carries the budget for any activities that cannot be attributed to an individual product line. If extra resources are
available from this account, they can be allocated to the other product lines to enhance their performance. Further,
in rare cases, MotherCo allocates extra resources to be spent on the marketing of ConsumerCo. Such extra
resources are made available, for instance, when a competitor (unexpectedly) launches a new product and a fast
response is required. Lastly, if the bottom line of ConsumerCo does not develop as desired, MotherCo may also
decide to cut the resources allocated to ConsumerCo to safeguard profits. In such a case, the managing director of
ConsumerCo and the controlling department must decide which product lines’ budgets will be reduced.
19. We acknowledge that changes in market share also depend on competitor actions and that an increase in sales that
is not accompanied by an increase in market share might indicate an aggressive market. However, given the firm’s
objective of continuous growth in market share, a stagnation or decrease in market share can be unsatisfactory out-
comes for MotherCo.
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6. Conclusion
We provide first insights into the determinants and consequences of budget reallocations. Budget
reallocations might well be justified for a particular budgeted entity as new and valuable informa-
tion is revealed during a period. However, given the scarcity of resources, changes to the budget
of one entity typically also require changes to the budget of another. We show that such
reallocations are directly linked to the initial budgeting, in the sense that misallocations regarding
initial allocations are associated with reallocations, with the aim of correcting inefficiencies.20
Most importantly, we show that ultimately these reallocations do not lead to performance
improvements, suggesting that reallocations might not mitigate the effects of the initial
TABLE 7
End-of-year performance as a function of budget reallocations
Variable
(1) (1) (2) (2)
CH_MSHARE CH_MSHARE Q4_SALESPERF Q4_SALESPERF
Intercept 0.005 0.006 0.262 0.221









NEWPL 0.005 0.006* 0.059 0.216
[0.003] [0.003] [0.422] [0.458]
LCYCLE 0.003 0.003 0.049 0.010
[0.003] [0.002] [0.165] [0.166]
CH_CM% 0.005** 0.004* 0.147 0.422*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.354] [0.237]
LMSHARE 0.021 0.019 0.566 0.187
[0.026] [0.024] [2.643] [2.519]
LAUNCH 0.004 0.005 0.253* 0.287**
[0.003] [0.004] [0.125] [0.136]
COMP 0.003 0.002 0.085 0.081
[0.005] [0.005] [0.158] [0.130]
TV 0.008* 0.008** 0.167 0.401*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.217] [0.228]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-category fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.202 0.209 0.086 0.383
n 122 122 122 122
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. See the Appen-
dix for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, two-tailed,
respectively.
20. Our analysis assumes the measurement of the near-optimal allocation (and thus misallocation) sufficiently captures
the “real” near-optimal allocation. While the near-optimal allocation rule is valid under very general assumptions,
we are to some extent restricted in estimating the parameters that go into this rule. As such, our hypotheses tests are
joint tests of the hypotheses and the validity of the underlying empirical measure.
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misallocations. They might even make things worse. While we show that initially over-allocated
entities do experience cuts in the reallocation process, these remedies might come too late. In
other words, the best way to achieve high performance is to avoid misallocations in the first
place. This emphasizes the value of efficient budgeting, justifying the high amount of money and
time firms put into their annual budgets.
There are a number of features specific to our setting worth discussing in light of the general-
izability of our results. One important feature is that sales and profit plans for the business groups
are set in a top-down manner. While such planning policies are not unusual, this design feature
has two important implications.21 First, managers can, in general, lobby for numerous things,
including easier performance targets (slack) and more resources. In our setting, sales managers
have no opportunity to lobby for lower sales plans, which leaves only lobbying for more
resources as an option, that is, a higher marketing budget. Therefore, lobbying efforts in our set-
ting are concentrated on the marketing budget. While this fact is surely not generalizable, what
matters is that the allocation of resources is perturbed by rent-seeking, a finding that has also been
shown in literature and is not specific to this setting. Under a more participative planning process,
the incentives for rent-seeking remain, but negotiations become more complicated because plans
are a key determinant of budget allocations. That is, the measurement of the near-optimal share
would be obscured by rent-seeking in the planning process and/or other drivers of cross-
subsidization might play a bigger role. Thus, we can test our theory in a rather clean setting. Sec-
ond and relatedly, given the planning process, the relative difficulty of the plans is higher for
weaker entities. If over-allocation is associated with weak versus strong entities, then over-
allocation is also expected to be associated with sales performance, compared to plans. In a set-
ting where managers can influence their sales plans, we might not find an association between
misallocations and sales performance, given that such plans could reflect the relative strength of
entities. This implies that, to test the underlying theory that relates to cross-subsidization, we
merely use an empirical design choice specific to our setting. A final important feature of our set-
ting is that product line managers do not have explicit targets related to product line profits,
implying that they do not bear the direct cost of having a higher marketing budget. This also
implies that the benefits of rent-seeking are relatively high, which makes our setting a powerful
one for testing our theory. We acknowledge that under a different corporate planning process or
an alternative incentive scheme for product line managers, rent-seeking could be less beneficial.
Clearly, if there is no rent-seeking in the initial budget allocation process, then there is also no
need to use reallocations to correct for such inefficiencies. Our results do not suggest otherwise.
More importantly, it is safe to assume that not all information and agency problems are resolved
by such alternative mechanisms and thus that (some) rent-seeking will remain “in equilibrium”
(Stein 2003, 113), that is, in settings other than the one we examine. In sum, while some of our
key empirical design choices are specific to our setting, our theoretical arguments and the infer-
ences we draw are not.
Key to the problem we investigate is the inability of organizations and researchers alike to
observe rent-seeking. We thus cannot provide direct evidence that the cross-subsidization and its
correction we show are indeed driven by rent-seeking. We acknowledge that no single test by
itself can confirm rent-seeking. However, the entirety of our empirical evidence, across multiple
tests, is consistent with rent-seeking at least partially driving cross-subsidization and inconsistent
with alternative explanations suggested by literature (i.e., naïve diversification). We therefore
interpret our findings as evidence that correction for rent-seeking is one important driver of the
budget reallocations, yet most likely not the only one. We do acknowledge that additional drivers
of cross-subsidization other than rent-seeking will play a role in reallocation decisions that might
also influence our findings.
21. In fact, around 50% of multidivisional firms indicate setting business group targets in a rather top-down way, most
importantly due to the pressure of meeting or beating the corporate target (Feichter et al. 2018).
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BUDGETSHARE The total marketing budget of product line i divided by the sum of
all marketing budgets of the division
OPTIMALSHARE The near-optimal share of the marketing budget per product line
MISALLOCATION Excess marketing budget at the product line level in a given year;
that is, BUDGETSHARE  OPTIMALSHARE
CAT_ PRODUCTIVITY An ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5, representing the quintiles of
OPTIMALSHARE
%OVERALLOCATION Equals MISALLOCATION if MISALLOCATION is positive and zero
otherwise
%UNDERALLOCATION Equals 1MISALLOCATION if MISALLOCATION is negative and
zero otherwise
IND_OVERALLOCATION An indicator variable that equals one if MISALLOCATION is
nonzero, and zero otherwise
%REALLOCATION The difference between the budgeted and actual share of marketing
capital received
IND_SHARECUT An indicator variable that equals one if %REALLOCATION is
negative, and zero otherwise
PLANSLS The budget sales of product line i
NPL The number of product lines at time t
SHARE_EQUAL 1 over NPL, representing the expected share of the marketing budget
if it was divided equally over all product lines
SHARE_SIZE The lagged actual sales of product line i divided by the sum of
lagged actual sales of the division, representing the relative size of
the product line
NEWPL An indicator variable that equals one if a new product line is
launched, and zero otherwise
LCYCLE An indicator variable that equals one when a product line i is in the
growth stage, and zero when it is in the maturity stage
B_CM Total budgeted contribution margin per product line i, exclusive
marketing cost in euros
B_CM% Budgeted average contribution margin to sales ratio per product line
i, exclusive marketing cost
CH_CM% The difference between actual and budgeted average contribution
margin to sales ratio per product line i, exclusive marketing cost
COMP An indicator variable that equals one if the degree of competition in
the product line’s market is high and zero otherwise
LMSHARE The lagged market share per product line i
LAUNCH An indicator variable that equals one in the case of at least one
launch in the product line i in division j at time t, and zero
otherwise
MSHARE The market share per product line i
Q1_PERF_YTD Year-to-date performance after the first quarter in terms of sales
target achievement, calculated as the realized sales after the first
quarter minus the budgeted sales after the first quarter (extrapolated
from the total budgeted sales), scaled by the budget
(The table is continued on the next page)
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